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TRUTH OR DARE: THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
AND STRETCHING THE DISCOVERY BOUNDARIES
Mississippi Bar v. Land
653 So. 2d 899 (Miss. 1994)
Katherine A. Smith
Hell is truth seen too late - duty neglected in its season.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you are at a deposition and your client is asked if he was 'wearing
glasses' at the time of the car crash ('his license says he's got to'). Your client
answers yes and produces them. He later tells you that the glasses were not his
but his son's and a 'mile too weak.' He had worn them by mistake.2
Now suppose that you have come across a witness who can supply a factual
piece of evidence harmful to your client's case. You conclude that if you make a
motion for summary judgment you would win because the opposing counsel has
not been able to present an affidavit on a vital point. However your secretly-dis-
covered witness could supply this essential link in the opposition's evidentiary
chain. The witness has not been contacted by the opposing party, and you
assume no one else knows of his existence.3
Unfortunately, problems such as these are not rare. Lawyers are confronted
every day with the ethical dilemma of zealously representing a client and the
duty of candor toward the court and opposing counsel. Despite the guidelines
given in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and in its predecessor, the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, there is no rule that clearly gives an
answer in all situations.
This Note briefly examines the history and purpose behind the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. This Note then examines the Mississippi Supreme Court's
basis for its decision in Mississippi Bar v. Land4 by looking at the existing prece-
dent in Mississippi and studying similar decisions in other jurisdictions. This
Note also questions the court's application of relevant factors in sanctioning Jack
Land.
1. Attributed to TRYON EDWARDS, A DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS 225 (1891).
2. Taken substantially from Stephen Gillers, Truth or Consequences, 80 A.B.A. J. 103 (Feb. 1994).
3. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 228 (5th ed. 1991).
4. Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899 (Miss. 1994).
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Underlying Case
On May 26, 1990, Plaintiff Billy Ray Stephens received an eye injury while
driving past the home of Jim Guthrie in Petal, Mississippi.' Doctor John
Pendergrass reported in a letter to the plaintiff's attorney, Michael B. McMahan,
that Stephens was struck by a rock in the left eye, leaving him with a "significant
loss of vision" and little chance of recovery.8 He further commented,
"[Stephens] believes that the rock may have come from someone mowing the
grass on a nearby lawn as he drove past."7 Stephens later testified in a deposi-
tion: "Whenever I went through there I heard a lawn mower and I looked over
and I looked back ahead of me and then something hit me."8
Before Stephens filed suit, the Guthrie's insurance carrier representative,
Rachel Cole, investigated the events leading to the plaintiff's claim of an eye
injury.9 In Cole's written report there was information that the Guthrie's son,
David, and a friend had not only mowed the lawn, but had also shot a BB gun on
the day the plaintiff was hurt.1"
In a statement taken by Rachel Cole, Sherry Guthrie remembered staying
inside the house the morning of May 26, 1990, while her son, David, mowed the
lawn.11 He was joined by a neighborhood friend, Ashley McAlexander, and they
took turns with the lawn mower.12 The boys came into the house for lunch, rest-
ed a little while, and then went back outside to play.13 Later, Stephens' cousin
came by the Guthrie's house and asked Mrs. Guthrie if she had heard any shots. 4
David Guthrie himself recounted that after resting he and Ashley McAlexander
went outside to play in their clubhouse, discovered a BB gun, and started "shoot-
ing across the road."1 5 While shooting, the boys heard a car reduce speed. 6
They got scared, hid the BB gun, and ran inside the house.17
On July 17, 1990, Stephens' attorney McMahan wrote a letter to Jim Guthrie
stating that a rock slung from a lawn mower in Guthrie's yard injured Stephens.'
8
McMahan requested an opportunity to inspect the mower and owner's manual
and to interview the mower operator. 9
5. Id. at 901. Stephens stated in a deposition that all the windows were down in the four-door Chevrolet
Citation he was driving. Appellee's Record Excerpts at 24, 26.
6. Appellee's Record Excerpts at 8.
7. Id.






14. Mississippi Bar's Record Excerpts at 20.
15. Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 901 (Miss. 1994).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Appellee's Record Excerpts at 4.
19. Id.
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McMahan wrote to Guthrie's insurance carrier, State Farm, on November 2,
1990, and again requested an interview with either Jim Guthrie or the mower
operator.20 McMahan offered to "freely exchange" information with State Farm
and asked that both sides "lay everything out on the table. 21
A complaint was eventually filed against Guthrie for $25,000 on February 21,
1991, in the Circuit Court of Forrest County, Mississippi. 22 The complaint
alleged, on information and belief, that Stephens was injured by the negligent
operation of Defendant Guthrie's lawn mower, causing it to throw a rock into
Stephens' vehicle and severely injure his eye.23
On March 8, 1991, Attorney Jack W Land wrote a letter to McMahan inform-
ing him that he had been hired to represent Jim Guthrie in this action.24
Land noticed Plaintiff Stephens' deposition for April 3, 1991, and McMahan
requested permission to inspect and take photographs of the mower.21 In
Stephens' deposition, he did not ever mention the possibility that a BB had hit
him in the eye.26 In fact, Stephens testified with certainty that he remembered
seeing and hearing a lawn mower in Guthrie's yard at the time of the injury.27
Stephens also recalled in his deposition that the eye injury occurred around
10:30 or 10:45 a.m. 28 However, he later amended his deposition to state that he
was injured sometime around 12:30 or 1:00 p.m.29 The hospital records show
that Stephens arrived at Forrest General Hospital around 1:25 p.m.3"
On April 19, 1991, Land filed a Motion for Protective Order seeking to prohib-
it Stephens from taking the deposition of Rachel Cole, the defendant's insurance
representative, or obtaining the defendant's claim file.31 Land claimed the file
contained work product and trial preparation material which was not discover-
able.32
20. Mississippi Bar's Record Excerpts at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id.
24. Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 902 (Miss. 1994).
25. Appellee's Record Excerpts at 15, 16.
26. Land, 653 So. 2d at 902.
27. Id.
28. Appellee's Record Excerpts at 39.
29. Id. at 63.
30. Id.
31. Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 902 (Miss. 1994).
32. Id.
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B. The Bar's Formal Complaint
The Mississippi Bar charged Attorney Jack Land with violating the Rules of
Professional Conduct based upon Land's answers to Stephens' Interrogatories33
and the following facts. 4
33. On April 15, 1991, Land objected to the plaintiff's request for production of any statements taken or
investigative reports made concerning the accident. Id. The following information was included in the
response:
REQUESTNO. 4: A copy of any statements taken, concerning the accident, by you or anyone acting
on your behalf.
RESPONSE: Defendant objects on the ground that any statements taken are work product, trial
preparation and contains mental impressions and conclusions of Defendant's insurer and indemnifi-
er...
REQUESTNO. 5: A copy of any investigative report made by you or anyone acting on your behalf.
RESPONSE: Defendant objects on the same ground as to Request No. 4 above.
REQUEST NO. 6: A copy of any photograph or motion picture, made by you or anyone acting on
your behalf, which in any manner relates to this lawsuit, including a photograph taken of the subject
lawn mower as it appeared on May 26, 1990.
RESPONSE: Will produce.
Id.
On April 15, 1991, Land answered Stephens' interrogatories for his client, Guthrie. Id. Land stated that he
sent Guthrie copies of his answers to discovery and requested that Guthrie notify him immediately if any
answer was incorrect. Id. The following answers were given by Guthrie to the interrogatories:
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Please identify the name and address of each and every person known to
you to have been involved in or observed any part of the accident in question.
ANSWER: 1 have no knowledge of anyone involved in or having observed any such accident. The
lawn mower was in operation on the date of the alleged accident by David Nelson Guthrie and he
was assisted by neighbor's son, Ashley McAlexander, under the supervision of my wife, Sherrye
Guthrie, at my direction. Excepting that I had not sanctioned Ashley's presents [sic] or use of my
lawn mower.
INTERROGATORYNO. 3: Please identify all persons, whether you or anyone acting on your behalf,
who obtained statements from or interviewed anyone during the course of investigating this case and
for each statement, please state when, where, and to whom the statement was made and what was
said.
ANSWER: State Farm Representative, Rachel Cole, and attorneys.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please state the name, age, and address of the person operating the lawn
mower at the time of the accident.
ANSWER: [Same response as No. 2].
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please state whether or not the results of the investigation, if any, were
reduced to writing. If so, please furnish the name, address and employment of the person or persons
having possession of such a report.
ANSWER: I have no personal knowledge of any written reports.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please describe the conclusions, if any, reached by you or anyone act-
ing on your behalf, as a result of your investigation as to the cause of the accident.
ANSWER: I have no information that convinces me that the alleged accident occurred.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please state whether you or anyone acting on your behalf made any
photographs or motion pictures and, if so, please state when such photographs or motion pictures
were taken and describe what each purports to depict.
ANSWER: Rachel Cole inspected the lawn mower in the Fall of 1990 and took a picture of it.
Id. at 902, 903.
34. Id. at 903. The Bar contended Land violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct:
1. Rule 3.3(a)(1) (making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal);
2. Rule 3.3(a)(2) (failing to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client);
3. Rule 3.4(a) (unlawfully obstructing another party's access to evidence or unlawfully altering,
destroying or concealing a document or other material having potential evidentiary value, or coun-
seling or assisting another person to do such act); and
4. Rule 8.4(c & d) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
Id. at 903, 904.
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On March 9, 1991, Land made a "marginal notation" in the Guthrie case file
next to two pictures of the BB gun taken by the Guthrie's insurance representa-
tive."5 The notation read: "Gun does not relate to civil action as worded in
Complaint! Do not produce."3
Guthrie answered Stephens' Interrogatories on April 15, 199 L" The Answers
to Interrogatories were not prepared until after Stephens' deposition of April 3, in
which he reiterated that he was hit in the eye while driving past the Guthrie resi-
dence where he saw a lawn mower in operation. 8
Interrogatory Number Six asked who was operating the lawn mower at the time
of the accident.39 Guthrie responded that his son David, and a neighbor's son,
Ashley McAlexander, were operating the lawn mower on May 26, 1990, but that
he had no knowledge of an accident.4" The Bar complained that Guthrie's
response was misleading because "it tends to admit that the lawn mower was in
use at the time of the accident."41
When asked by Interrogatory Number Eleven whether any reports of the acci-
dent were made, Guthrie responded that he had no "personal knowledge of any
written report." '42 Land in fact knew that the insurance representative had written
a report containing information of the BB gun. 3
Interrogatory Number Twelve asked for "the conclusions, if any, reached by
[Defendant Guthrie] or anyone acting on [his] behalf, as a result of [his] investi-
gation as to the cause of the accident."44 In response, Guthrie stated that he had
"no information that convince[d] [him] that the alleged incident occurred."4 The
Bar argued that this answer omitted the fact that Defendant Guthrie and Land
were aware that Guthrie's son and a friend had admitted shooting "across the
road" on the day of the alleged incident.4 In effect, the Bar claimed, this
response gave the impression that Guthrie and Land "had no evidence of how
Stephens was injured."47
In his response to Interrogatory Number Thirteen,48 Guthrie answered that
"Cole inspected the lawn mower in the fall of 1990 and took a picture of it."'4
Guthrie did not mention that Cole also took pictures of the BB gun and that these
pictures were given to Land.50
35. Id. at 903.
36. Id. Guthrie was not due to answer discovery until April 8, 1991. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Mississippi Bar's Brief at 5.
40. Id.
41. Id.




46. Mississippi Bar's Brief at 6.
47. Id.
48. Interrogatory No. 13 asked whether Guthrie or "anyone acting on [his] behalf made any photographs or
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On April 19, 1991, Land's runner mistakenly delivered Land's file on the case
to Plaintiff's attorney McMahan." The runner had been instructed to deliver the
file to Land's partner, who practiced in another office in Hattiesburg,
Mississippi.52
McMahan went through the file and discovered the photographs and informa-
tion concerning the BB gun shooting. 3 McMahan then associated Attorney
William L. Denton of Biloxi, Mississippi, who filed an Amended Complaint
which added Land and State Farm as defendants and alleged "negligent use of
the BB gun, tortious interference with cause of action by allegedly concealing
evidence and giving false discovery responses."54 The Amended Complaint
asked for $50,000 in actual damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages.5"
C. Disposition in the Complaint Tribunal
On July 7, 1992, the Mississippi Supreme Court appointed a Complaint
Tribunal" to hear the Bar's complaint against Jack Land.57 Hearings were held
January 8 and June 4, 1993, in Jackson, Mississippi.58 The Tribunal unanimously
dismissed all allegations against Land after finding that he had violated none of
the Rules of Professional Conduct. 9 The Bar appealed the Complaint Tribunal's
dismissal of the action to the Mississippi Supreme Court.6"
III. HISTORY AND LAW
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct had their genesis over 150 years
ago.61 In 1836, a Baltimore attorney named David Hoffman published the first
code of legal ethics in the United States.62 Hoffman's code consisted of fifty res-
olutions cautioning lawyers how to conduct themselves in practice. 3 In 1854,
Judge George Sharswood lectured on legal ethics to a class at the University of
Pennsylvania.64 Sharswood's Essay on Professional Ethics was published that
same year. 5
The Alabama State Bar Association adopted the first code of professional
ethics in 1887.66 This code was based on Sharswood's lectures at the
51. Appellee's Brief at 17.
52. Id. The runner mistakenly delivered the file to "Mike" McMahan instead of Land's partner "Mike"
Randolph, who was supposed to appear at a hearing on the Stephens case for Land. Id.; Mississippi Bar's Brief
at 7.
53. Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 903 (Miss. 1994).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. The Complaint Tribunal was composed of a circuit judge, a chancellor, and a practicing attorney.
Appellee's Brief at 2.




61. Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 Am. B. FOiND. REs. J. 953, 953.
62. Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063, 1064 (July 1978).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1063.
65. Id.
66. Schwartz, supra note 61, at 954.
[VOL. 16:2
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University.67 The preamble to the Alabama Code quoted Sharswood: "There is,
perhaps, no profession after that of the sacred ministry, in which a high-toned
morality is more imperatively necessary than that of the law.""8
The American Bar Association [hereinafter ABA] promulgated its Canons of
Professional Ethics in 1908 based on the Alabama ethics code.69 In the following
twenty years a majority of states adopted some conformation of the Canons.7"
The Canons, however, were unclear and the ABA's Committee on Professional
Ethics and Grievances was kept busy interpreting its provisions.7' Nevertheless,
it was not until 1964 that a "Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical
Standards" was formed to review the adequacy of the Canons.72
The Special Committee produced a Code of Professional Responsibility that
was unanimously adopted by the House of Delegates on August 12, 1969."3 The
Committee divided the Code into three distinct sections: Canons, Ethical
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules.74 Ethical Considerations, which are
"aspirational in character," are distinguished from the Disciplinary Rules, which
are "mandatory in character," and "state the minimum level of conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."7 " The
Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules both derive from the Canons,
which are simply "statements of axiomatic norms."7"
Within ten years after the adoption of the Code, the "Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards" was formed to evaluate the Code's effec-
tiveness.77 The American Bar Association accepted the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in 1980.78 Unlike the Code, the Model Rules contain no
ethical principles.79 Instead, the Rules are intended to be adopted by the appro-
priate state institutions as enforceable law with attendant disciplinary penalties.8 "
Mississippi adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct in July, 1987.81
B. Survey of Relevant Mississippi Supreme Court Precedents
The Mississippi Supreme Court manifested its resolve to sanction dishonest
attorneys in the case of Barfield v. Mississippi State Bar Ass 'n."2 In Barfield, the
defendant attorney falsified a classmate's law school transcript and used it in
67. Schwartz, supra note 61, at 954.
68. Armstrong, supra note 62, at 1063.
69. Armstrong, supra note 62, at 1064; Schwartz, supra note 61, at 954.
70. Armstrong, supra note 62, at 1064-65.
71. Armstrong, supra note 62, at 1065.
72. Armstrong, supra note 62, at 1069.
73. Armstrong, supra note 62, at 1069.
74. Armstrong, supra note 62, at 1069.
75. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980).
76. Id.
77. Schwartz, supra note 61, at 955.
78. Schwartz, supra note 61, at 955.
79. Schwartz, supra note 61, at 955.
80. Schwartz, supra note 61, at 955.
81. Mississippi Bar v. Mathis, 620 So. 2d 1213, 1219 (Miss. 1993).
82. Barfield v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 547 So. 2d 46 (Miss. 1989).
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applying for a job with a large New Orleans firm.83 Moreover, the defendant
also represented to the firm that he had taken the Louisiana state bar examination
when, in fact, the Louisiana State Bar had refused to give the defendant permis-
sion to take the exam." When confronted with these misrepresentations, the
defendant resigned from the law firm.85 Affirming an order entered upon
default, the state disbarred the defendant for acts involving "dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, misrepresentations and moral turpitude.
86
In 1991, the Mississippi Supreme Court heard Culpepper v. Mississippi State
Bar," in which the defendant was charged with making misrepresentations to his
client during a divorce action.88 The court found that Culpepper gave his client a
different version of the settlement agreement reached between himself and
opposing counsel than the one actually entered into the record in court.89
The court disbarred Culpepper after pointing out that Culpepper had been
sanctioned before for similar misbehavior.90 In 1984, Culpepper had represented
Thomas Harvey in a divorce proceeding.91 Culpepper told the judge that Mr.
Harvey had agreed to a settlement. 2 In fact, Culpepper did not even have his
client's permission to assent to a settlement.
93
In Underwood v. Mississippi Bar,94 the Mississippi Supreme Court held that an
attorney who knowingly lies to his clients concerning the status of their case
should be suspended for one year.95 Attorney Underwood agreed to represent
plaintiffs in a personal injury suit.9 In 1989, Underwood falsely told his clients
that defendant's insurance company had agreed to a settlement of all their
claims." Underwood then informed his clients that the insurance company had
given him release forms for them to sign.98 When confronted with the fact that
the plaintiffs never acquired settlement checks, Underwood stated that the checks
were in the mail.99 Finally, after receiving no money, the clients filed a com-
plaint with the Bar.'
The Mississippi Supreme Court suspended Underwood from practice for one
year. 1 ' The court first addressed Underwood's continuous deceptions to his
83. Id. at 47.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 49.
87. Culpepper v. Mississippi State Bar, 588 So. 2d 413 (Miss. 1991).
88. Id.
89. Id. at417.




94. Underwood v. Mississippi Bar, 618 So. 2d 64 (Miss. 1993):
95. Id. at 68.
96. Id. at 65.
97. Id.
98. Id. When the plaintiffs arrived at Underwood's office to sign these forms, he was not there. Id.
Underwood had, however, left fake documents with his secretary for the plaintiffs to sign. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 66.
101. Id. at 68.
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clients over a period of two years. 2 Justice Pittman made clear that Underwood
was not just guilty of neglect,"°3 but had acted instead "without regard for the
harm and inconvenience and mental anguish of the client."'0 4 Therefore,
Underwood violated his obligation of honesty to his clients.0 5
Finally, in 1993, the court heard the case of Mississippi Bar v. Mathis10 6 which
concerned attorney misrepresentation to the court and opposing counsel.'0 7
Attorney Mathis filed'suit against several insurance companies on behalf of
Becky Laughlin for bad faith refusal to pay benefits after her husband's death.'0 8
In the course of discovery, defendant Mathis concealed the fact that an autopsy
had been conducted on the body of his client's late husband, J.R. Laughlin.0 9
During the hearing before the Complaint Tribunal, Mathis stated that the
autopsy was performed in relation to the possibility of a criminal suit being filed
against Becky Laughlin."0 Therefore, he felt no need to disclose the autopsy in
response to discovery concerning his client's civil suit."' The Bar asserted that
an attorney must not be allowed to determine for himself whether certain infor-
mation is privileged."2
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court imposed a one year suspension
from practice on Mathis." 3 In response to Mathis' argument that the autopsy
was work product, the court stated that whether a privilege existed was not meant
to be decided by Mathis." 4 The court concluded that the need to restrain this
type of attorney conduct was evident and necessary."' The reputation of the
legal profession must be protected.
1 6
C. Ethical Decisions From Other Jurisdictions
An examination of other cases and fact scenarios in which the courts have
dealt with attorney dishonesty and misrepresentation demonstrates the diversity
and range of conduct the judiciary has felt compelled to deter.
In re Neitlich 7 is a Massachusetts case involving attorney misrepresentation
of the terms of a client's pending real estate sale."' Under the facts of the case,
Defendant Neitlich was hired to represent his client in a post-divorce proceeding
in which the client's former wife was attempting to gain security for a prior
102. Id. at 67.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 68.
106. Mississippi Bar v. Mathis, 620 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 1993).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1216.
109. Id. at 1217.
110. Id. at 1218.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1222.
114. Id. at 1221.
115. Id. at 1222.
116. Id.
117. In re Neitlich, 597 N.E.2d 425 (Mass. 1992).
118. Id.
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alimony order.119 The court approved a $400,000 attachment on the client's con-
dominium. 2 In 1987, the client accepted an offer to purchase the condominium
for $395,000.' Defendant Neitlich drafted two separate purchase and sell
agreements, one setting forth a $370,000 purchase price and the other covering
the sale of personalty for $25,000.122 After the defendant refused to give the
wife's attorney a copy of the agreement, she informed him she could not agree to
the sale. 123 However, at a hearing on the sale, at which opposing counsel was
absent, the defendant told the judge that opposing counsel "was not really
opposed" to the sale, but that she wanted an appraisal.2 4 He also represented to
the judge that the sale price of the condominium was $370,000.121
Later, the wife's attorney moved to vacate the order of the judge allowing the
sale of the property. 2 6 At this hearing, the defendant again represented that the
sale price was $370,000.127 He then gave opposing counsel a copy of the agree-
ment showing the price to be $370,000.128 The wife's attorney subsequently
learned of the second agreement for the sale of personalty.2 9
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts suspended Neitlich for one
year.30 The defendant argued before the court that his statements that the sale
price of the condominium was $370,000 were "technically correct."'' Because
his affirmation of purchase price arose in the setting of a real estate proceeding,
he had no duty to disclose the purchase price of the personalty. 2
The court reasoned that the defendant went too far in the representation of his
client.'33 To the defendant's argument that he faced a "conflicting duty" to the
court and his client, the court responded:
As an officer of the court, an attorney is a "key component of a system of jus-
tice," and is bound to uphold the integrity of that system by being truthful to the
court and opposing counsel. Where this duty is in seeming conflict with the
client's interest in zealous representation, the latter's interest must yield. Were
we to condone any action to the contrary, the integrity of the judicial process
would be vitiated.1
34




121. Id. at 425-26.







129. Id. at 427.
130. Id. at 430.
131. Id. at428.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 428.
134. Id. at 428-29 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 429.
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In Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse and Cold Storage Co.,136 a Michigan district
court set aside a personal injury settlement on the basis that the plaintiff's coun-
sel had not advised the opposing counsel of his client's death prior to entry of the
settlement order.137 The defendant argued that at no time was he asked by oppos-
ing counsel if his client was still alive.' 38 Thus, he reasoned, he had no duty to
offer that information.
13 9
In addressing the conflict between advocacy of a client and the duty of candor
to the court and opposing counsel, the court noted:
[C]andor and honesty necessarily require disclosure of such a significant fact as
the death of one's client. Opposing counsel does not have to deal with his
adversary as he would deal in the marketplace. Standards of ethics require
greater honesty, greater candor, and greater disclosure, even though it might not
be in the interest of the client or his estate.
140
The court also expressed the idea that a lawsuit is not to be conducted like a
game.' 4 ' An attorney has a duty of candor when she controls essential informa-
tion necessary to the fair disposition of a case.'42
In 1976, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held in In re Malloy143 that when
an attorney promises to produce "all" documents and only produces some of
them, there is a misrepresentation to opposing counsel that those are all the docu-
ments available. 144 The court addressed Malloy's contention that no harm was
done since the papers were produced before or at the trial. 14  "[T]he greater
harm is done to the judicial process, not to the parties .... [F]ailure to perform
commitments made in open court damages the judicial process regardless of
whether the parties are damaged."' 46 Malloy holds, therefore, that where an
attorney believes information is subject to a privilege, he has a duty to raise the
objection to the court and state his reason.
47
The California Supreme Court in Sullins v. State Bar'48 publicly reprimanded
an attorney for failing to disclose a letter by the beneficiary of a will stating that
he wanted no part of his aunt's estate.'49 Sullins was the lawyer for the executor
of the Weber estate. 50 Mrs. Elizabeth Weber specifically disinherited her daugh-
ter, Mrs. Gladys Heitz, and left the entire estate to her nephew, Bradford Fick.'
51
136. Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
137. Id. at 508.
138. Id. at 508-09.
139. Id. at 509.
140. Id. at 512.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. In re Malloy, 248 N.W2d 43 (N.D. 1976).
144. Id. at 46-47.
145. Id. at46.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 47.
148. Sullins v. State Bar, 542 P.2d 631 (Cal. 1975).
149. Id. at 634.
150. Id. at 633.
151. Id.
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Mrs. Heitz filed a petition in 1964 contesting the will. 1 2 Attorney Sullins then
wrote to Fick informing him of the will. 153 Fick wrote back and stated that he
wanted Mrs. Heitz to inherit the estate and that he would sign any papers neces-
sary to turn the property over to her.
154
Sullins never disclosed to the court or Mrs. Heitz that he had received a letter
from Fick. 5' In 1967, moreover, Sullins petitioned the court for approval of a
50% contingency fee for his legal services in the matter without disclosing Fick's
letter.'56 He stated to the court that the court-approved fee of 33 and 1/3% was
insufficient because Mrs. Heitz's suit "had been and would continue to be fierce-
ly contested."' 57
The California Supreme Court held that Sullins had "committed a fraud upon
the Court."15 8 The court refused to decide whether Sullins deceived the court for
personal gain, because misleading conduct in itself required discipline.'59
In In re Nigohosian,60 the Supreme Court of New Jersey suspended the defen-
dant for six months from the practice of law.'6 ' Plaintiff and defendant (in the
underlying suit) agreed to a settlement in which the defendant promised to pay
the plaintiff $2500.162 If the defendant did not pay by July 1, 1975, the defendant
was to give the plaintiff a second mortgage for $3000 on certain property he
owned. 6 3 The defendant hired Attorney Nigohosian to have the settlement set
aside. 64 Nigohosian did not disclose to the court that the property subject to the
mortgage was no longer titled in the defendant's name but had been conveyed to
a corporation newly formed by the defendant. 65
The court held that Nigohosian breached his duty of candor to the court and
opposing counsel by failing to reveal the true owner of the property.166 "We con-
tinue to honor the premise that 'an attorney is under a duty, when the proper
administration of justice so requires, to disclose all pertinent and relevant facts to
the court so that it may act fairly.' "1 67 Here, the status of the property was a "sig-
nificant fact" which required disclosure to the court."






158. Id. at 638.
159. Id. at 639.
160. In re Nigohosian, 442 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1982).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1007-08.
163. Id. at 1008.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1009.
167. Id. at 1010 (quoting In reTurner, 416 A.2d 894 (N.J. 1980)).
168. Id. at 1009.
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IV INSTANT CASE
A. The Majority
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in an eight-to-one opinion, held that Attorney
Jack Land deliberately deceived opposing counsel and Plaintiff Stephens, thus
prohibiting them from effectively pursuing their action.1 69 Justice Smith, writing
for the majority, rejected Land's claim that this case was a simple discovery dis-
pute.170 The court agreed that sanctioning Land was necessary to "maintain the
integrity of our adversary process .... ""' The majority, therefore, found that
truth was more important than technicalities in the legal system.'
The court reasoned from the case of Mississippi Bar v. Mathis17 3 that Land was
guilty of misconduct. 7 4 In asserting that Land's conduct was analogous to
Mathis' actions, the Land court noted:
Although Mathis argued that he was not required to disclose any of this infor-
mation because of attorney-client privilege and because the autopsy was his
work product, these arguments are without merit. Even if such privileges were
believed applicable by Mathis, it was not for him to determine that the privilege
applied. The proper procedure would have been for him to object to the inter-
rogatories and deposition question and affirmatively assert the privilege, leaving
the matter to be decided by the court.
17 5
The court went on to acknowledge that Land did act properly as to some
aspects of discovery, but that his response to the plaintiff's Interrogatories was
not simply an abuse of discovery.
17
The majority noted that Land had information that David Guthrie and a friend
shot at a target across the road on the day Stephens was injured. 7 In fact, on
March 12, 1991, Jim Guthrie stated in a deposition that David admitted that the
plaintiff's white vehicle was similar to the one that passed by as he and
McAlexander shot the BB gun.Y7 8 However, the court found that, rather than
claiming a work product privilege or objecting to discovery on the grounds that
plaintiff's requests were broad or vague, Land concealed the evidence relating to
the BB gun 7 9 Land's actions were improper, the court explained, because they
169. Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 909 (Miss. 1994).
170. Id. at 910. Attorney Land argued that the court intended to provide attorneys with guidelines by limiting
discovery to the "specific claims raised in the complaint and defenses in the answer." Appellee's Brief at 20.
The comment to Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (b)(l) states that "[d]iscovery should be limited
to the specific practices or acts that are in issue .... MRCP 26(b)(1) is intended to favor limitations, rather than
expansions, on permissible discovery." Land, 653 So. 2d at 906.
171. Land, 653 So. 2d at 910.
172. Id.
173. 620 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 1993). See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
174. Land, 653 So. 2d at 910.




179. Id. at 908.
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were "calculated to deceive" the plaintiff and to focus his attention only on the
lawn mower.'
The court rejected Land's contention that information relating to the BB gun
was not within the scope of plaintiff's discovery request.'81 In fact, the majority
asserted, Land probably would have never revealed the BB gun incident, "no
matter how any interrogatories were phrased."'82 The court reasoned that the BB
gun evidence was relevant to the issue of what caused Stephens' eye injury.8 3
Thus, Land was obligated to disclose the information in response to the
Interrogatories as they were originally phrased. 84
The majority also found fault with the timing of Land's Motion for Protective
Order."8 On April 18, 1991, the plaintiff's attorney McMahan filed a Motion for
Protective Order.' The motion stated that the plaintiff wanted access to the
insurance adjustor's investigation file.' 7 Shortly thereafter, Land filed his own
Motion for Protective Order, seeking to prohibit McMahan's access to the file.'
The court felt it "significant" that Land did not make his motion prior to
McMahan's request.8 9 Even more important, the court stated, was that Land did
not move for a protective order in response to plaintiff's Interrogatories.' 90 To the
majority, this conduct clearly eliminated any credibility Land had to maintain
that this case was only a discovery dispute.' 9'
The court followed the Mathis precedent and gave Land a one year
suspension. 92 The majority concluded that Land intentionally concealed evi-
dence concerning the BB gun incident. 93 To hold that Land's case should be
regarded as a discovery dispute, the court continued, would be approving a sys-
tem where the common goal is not the truth, but that of technical accuracy. 94
B. The Dissent
In a lone dissent, Justice Lee denounced the majority for establishing "a dan-






185. Id. at 909.
186. Id. at 908.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 909.
189. Id.
190. Id. The court felt that a request for a protective order was just as appropriate in response to the
Interrogatories as it was in response to plaintiff's attempt to gain access to the insurance representative's claim
file. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 910. Sanctions are decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 909 (citing Clark v. Mississippi State
Bar Ass'n, 471 So. 2d 352 (Miss. 1985); Brumfield v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 497 So. 2d 800 (Miss.
1987); Mississippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So. 2d 120 (Miss. 1987)). Factors generally considered, however,
include:
(1) nature of the misconduct, (2) the need to deter similar misconduct, (3) preservation of the dignity and repu-
tation of the profession, (4) protection of the public, and (5) sanctions imposed in similar cases.
Id. at 909 (citing Steighner v. Mississippi State Bar, 548 So. 2d 1294, 1297-98 (Miss. 1989)).
193. Id. at 910.
194. Id.
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Professional Conduct (hereinafter MRPC) as a weapon by which one attorney
may coerce or blackmail his opponent into a settlement." 195 The dissent accused
the majority of rewarding those attorneys who draft broad and poorly worded
discovery requests, while penalizing attorneys who narrowly interpret these
vague requests. 96 To the dissent, this position plainly disregarded the lawyer's
duty of confidentiality to his client.197
The dissent argued that the court's holding was unfair to Land, who had used
the discovery process in the way intended by the Mississippi Rules of Civil
Procedure.' 98 Justice Lee stressed that the specific issue in the Stephens' suit
was whether Guthrie negligently operated the lawn mower, thereby injuring the
plaintiff.19 9 All discovery requests propounded by Stephens were tailored to the
lawn mower allegation and did not seek to discover any additional theories as to
how the plaintiff was injured. 00
By requiring attorneys to engage in sweeping disclosure, the dissent explained,
the court seeks to force a lawyer "to disclose all of his client's confidences dur-
ing the course of discovery."2"1 The majority's holding was incorrect, argued the
dissent, because it applied virtually an ex post facto law to Land's conduct in
answering the plaintiff's Interrogatories." 2 The dissent maintained that
Mississippi had never before required broad disclosure.0 Therefore, attorneys,
including Land, are entitled to advance notice before the court dictates a stricter
standard in a disciplinary proceeding. 4
The dissent then implied strongly that perhaps it was the plaintiff's attorney
who was incompetent in not discovering the information about the BB gun inci-
dent.205 Guthrie gave plaintiff's attorney McMahan the names of all the people
who were involved in or observed the accident. 6 Moreover, Guthrie told
McMahan that State Farm representative Rachel Cole had investigated the acci-
dent.2 0 7 Through the use of these answers, Justice Lee argued, Attorney
McMahan could have asked all involved whether there were any other possibili-
ties as to how the plaintiff was injured.20 " According to the dissent, then,
McMahan could have discovered the BB gun shooting "had he chosen to exer-
cise some amount of diligence. 20 9
195. Id. (Lee, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 911. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) states that "[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the issues raised by the claims or defenses of any
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Turning to the majority's assertion that the Land case was simply another
Mathis case, the dissent questioned the court's reliance upon facts which were
inconsistent with Land's conduct.2 10 The court found Attorney Mathis lied to
opposing counsel and to the lower court concerning the results of an autopsy.2
Justice Lee felt, in contrast, that Land did not lie in his responses to the plain-
tiff's discovery requests, and thus, Mathis should not be used as precedent. 12
Land did not attempt to hide information. Instead, the dissent argued, Guthrie
answered the discovery questions as they "related to the specific act at issue, i.e.,
the alleged lawn mower accident. 21 4
V ANALYSIS
A. Public Citizen or Advocate (Or Is There a Difference?)
Basing its decision on the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Mississippi
Supreme Court rejected the argument that Land was simply engaged in aggres-
sive discovery and that he should be sanctioned only by Rule 37 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, if at all. By viewing the case in this manner, the court was able
to easily dismiss Land's claim that he had an ethical dilemma between opposing
counsel and his client. Defense lawyers are probably not pleased with the broad
overtones of this decision. On the other hand, those who believe that truth has
lately been ranked below that of the idea of the adversary system must be
relieved. The differing views on the usefulness of the adversarial process are
demonstrated by the majority and dissenting opinions in Land. The opinions
reach different conclusions because they are based on different premises about
the way the legal system should function. In the majority's view, because Jack
Land never claimed a privilege or objected tothe interrogatories, his conduct was
misleading and therefore harmful to the judicial process.15 On the other hand,
the dissent took a more lenient approach and held that Land did exactly what he
was taught to do in law school - that is, Land interpreted the plaintiff's inter-
rogatories in a way that enabled him to protect his client.18
The difficulty, of course, is deciding what the ethical standard should be for the
advocate. The Mississippi case of Singleton v. Stegall" noted:
[T]he purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing
parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is just basis for a lawyer's
self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disci-
210. Id. at 912.
211. Mississippi Bar v. Mathis, 620 So. 2d 1213, 1222 (Miss. 1993); see supra notes 106-16 and accompany-
ing text.
212. Mississippi Barv. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 912 (Miss. 1994).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 907.
216. Id. at912.
217. Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1991).
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plinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or
transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.218
The dissent in Land pointed out that, technically, the plaintiff's interrogatories
were framed only by the prior pleadings which solely mentioned the possibility
of injury by negligent operation of a lawn mower.219 The ramification of allow-
ing sanctions for attorney conduct such as Land's, the dissent argued, is that
lawyers will now "use the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct as a
weapon" against opposing counsel.22
Perhaps Dean Monroe Freedman best expounded the view expressed by Justice
Lee in the Land dissent. Dean Freedman disagreed with those jurists who claim
that the adversary system is harmful to the truth.221 Indeed, Dean Freedman
underscored the point that "in a society that respects the dignity of the individual,
truth-seeking cannot be an absolute value, but may be subordinated to other
ends, although that subordination may sometimes result in the distortion of the
truth." '222 This opinion is perfectly consistent with Justice Lee's conclusion that
Land's duty to protect his client's confidences was higher than his duty of candor
to opposing counsel.22a
It is notable that Justice Lee's view of the adversarial process is shared by
Professor Samuel Williston.224 In Professor Williston's autobiography, he
recounted an incident in which he was counsel for the defendant.225 Williston
had possession of all of his client's correspondence.226 Opposing counsel had
filed several interrogatories, but had never asked any questions concerning the
letters. 27 No proof concerning the letters or the facts contained therein was
made at trial.228 The court held for the defendant.229 Williston wrote:
In the course of his remarks the Chief Justice stated as one reason for his
decision a supposed fact which I knew to be unfounded. I had in front of
me a letter that showed his error. Though I have no doubt of the propri-
ety of my behavior in keeping silent, I was somewhat uncomfortable at
the time.
The lawyer must decide when he takes a case whether it is a suitable one
for him to undertake and after this decision is made, he is not justified in
218. Id. at 1245 n.4.
219. Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 911 (Miss. 1994).
220. Id. at 910.
221. Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankels Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1061 (1975).
222. Id. at 1065 (footnote omitted).
223. Land, 653 So. 2d at 912.
224. SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 270-72 (1940).
225. Id. at 270-71.
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turning against his client by exposing injurious evidence entrusted to
him.
230
Thus, Professor Williston clearly thought an advocate's primary obligation was
to protect his client's confidences.
Although controversial, the decision in Land was a sound one. The majority
upheld the view that truth is the ultimate goal of the adversary process. This
approach was substantiated by a survey which catalogued the increasingly eva-
sive and dilatory practices of trial lawyers. 23 ' The lawyers interviewed agreed
that the rules of discovery are capable of being effective. 232 However, they noted,
the rules are also easily susceptible to abuse if not patrolled by other lawyers and
the judiciary.
233
The most negative conduct cited by the survey is the practice of evasion in
answering interrogatories, the same practice for which Jack Land was suspended
from the practice of law.234  Sixty-one percent of the attorneys surveyed com-
plained about evasion. 23' This practice is most commonly associated with inter-
rogatories.238 The author of the survey stated that the most obvious kind of eva-
sion is "the habit of manipulating the definitions of opponents' words, interpret-
ing their interrogatories, document demands, or deposition questions as narrowly,
broadly, or selectively as possible for the purpose of serving a client's adversarial
interests. 23 7
The dissent, therefore, was clearly wrong in approving Land's behavior on the
basis that he was correct in placing a narrow interpretation on Rule 26 of the
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. 23 ' No matter which approach one adheres
to, that of truth-above-all-else or client confidentiality, Jack Land's conduct was
still blameworthy. As the majority aptly states, "Land's proceeding to respond to
interrogatories rather than also submitting the issues to be decided by the trial
court defeats his argument regarding misconduct on this point ....
230. Id. at 271-72.
231. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and
Abuses, 1980 Am. B. FouND. REs. J. 789.
232. Id. at 796.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 828-29.
235. Id. at 829.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 910 (Miss. 1994). Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) provides:
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery
is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the issues raised by the claims or defenses of any party. The discovery may include the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things; and the identity and location of persons (i) having knowledge of any discoverable matter or
(ii) who may be called as witnesses at the trial. It is not ground for objection that the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Id. at 910-11. The dissent also argued that the comments to Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) state that "[d]iscovery
should be limited to the specific practices or acts that are in issue. Determining when discovery spills beyond
'issues' and into 'subject matter' will not always be easy, but MRCP 26(b)(1) is intended to favor limitations,
rather than expansions, on permissible discovery." Id. at 911.
239. Id. at 907.
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Consider, for instance, Land's response to plaintiff's request for production
Number Six, which asked for "[a] copy of any photograph or motion picture...
which in any manner relates to this lawsuit."24 Land responded, "Will
Produce." 4' No matter how the interrogatory was worded, Land's reply misleads
opposing counsel to believe that he is getting all of the pictures in Land's posses-
sion.
Again, consider Interrogatory Number Thirteen and Land's answer. In
response to Interrogatory Number Thirteen, Land replied that "Rachel Cole
inspected the lawn mower in the Fall of 1990 and took a picture of it," without
raising an objection to the discoverability of the pictures of the BB gun which
were also in Land's file.242
How far, however, does the Land Court propose a trial advocate must go in this
quest for the truth? The Land opinion has only served to raise problems and
uncertainty; the court's broad holding has engendered confusion. For instance,
how will a lawyer know that he has complied with his discovery obligations? By
what criteria can an attorney evaluate his responsibility to disclose information to
opposing counsel or the court?
Although the holding in Land is less than clear, the majority does focus its
opinion on the responses to interrogatories filed by Land.243 The court stated that
Land "knowingly concealed potentially significant facts and evidence in his pos-
session." '244 Moreover, the court states that Mississippi Bar v. Mathis is particu-
larly compelling. 45 In Mathis, the defendant attorney was sanctioned for not
asserting a privilege in response to interrogatories and deposition questions.24 '
This decision by the Land Court, therefore, is an attempt to give attorneys a
strong incentive to fairly and accurately answer discovery requests without
stretching interpretative boundaries.
A clear result of this case is that an attorney should always resolve uncertain-
ties in favor of disclosure or the claim of privilege when evaluating discovery
requests on the basis of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b). This court
would also more than likely sanction an attorney who failed to volunteer signifi-
cant information to the court which was never even asked for by opposing coun-
sel.247 The difficult question, of course, is what is a significant fact. Obviously,
facts relevant to the outcome of the case are included. This question, however,
may not be easily evaluated at the beginning of an action when the issues in the
pleadings have not yet become narrowly focused. Thus, Land simply leaves us
with an unsettled feeling and an old cliche' - "when in doubt, err on the side of
caution."
240. Id. at 902.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 903.
243. Id. at 907.
244. Id. at910.
245. Id. at 906-07.
246. Mississippi Bar v. Mathis, 620 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 1993); See supra notes 110-20.
247. See, e.g., example given in note 2.
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B. Appropriateness of the Remedy
Having decided that Jack Land violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Mississippi Supreme Court suspended him from the practice of law for one
year.248 This punishment was clearly excessive in light of Land's conduct and
past case precedent.
Although sanctions are decided by the court on a case-by-case basis,249 the
court generally considers the "(1) nature of the misconduct, (2) the need to deter
similar misconduct, (3) preservation of the dignity and reputation of the profes-
sion, (4) protection of the public, and (5) sanctions imposed in similar cases. 250
In Land's case, the "nature of the misconduct" is particularly important.
Land's responses in discovery did tend to mislead the plaintiff. However, Land's
conduct was not clearly egregious. Land did not seek to hide witnesses who had
knowledge of the BB gun incident. 21 Likewise, Land disclosed the name of the
insurance agent who investigated the plaintiff's injury and the BB gun shoot-
ing.25 2 The dissent, therefore, is correct when it states that the plaintiff could
have easily discovered the BB gun incident, or other possible reasons for the
plaintiff's injury by using the information already given to him by Land.25 3
Additionally, the Complaint Tribunal unanimously dismissed all claims of ethi-
cal violations against Jack Land.2 4 The Tribunal even chastised the Bar for
bringing the action: "Now, further, for the record, unanimously it's being stated
by this Tribunal that this Tribunal also is concerned with the direction that the
Bar is taking regarding these complaints, because this Bar - this Tribunal com-
pletely disagrees with this cause of action. 2 5 Thus, it is plain that the nature of
Land's conduct was not such that everyone would even agree he was guilty of
ethical violations, much less that he should be suspended for a year.
To satisfy the requirement of considering similar sanctions, the court cites the
Mathis case as precedent for Land's one year suspension. 2 6 Although Land did
mislead opposing counsel in discovery, it runs counter to logic to state that
Mathis' and Land's actions were similar for purposes of imposing punishment.
In Mathis, the defendant failed to reveal that he had actually had a body
exhumed and autopsied.25 7 In response to an interrogatory asking for informa-
tion concerning any tests or inspections made of objects involved in the incident,
Mathis replied that none were made.2 8 Responding to a question asking for a
248. Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 910 (Miss. 1994).
249. Id. at 909 (citing Clark v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 471 So. 2d 352 (Miss. 1985); Brumfield v.
Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 497 So. 2d 800 (Miss. 1987); Mississippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So. 2d 210
(Miss. 1987)).




254. Appellee's Brief at 2.
255. Appellee's Record Excerpts at 2, 3.
256. Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 910 (Miss. 1994).
257. Mississippi Bar v. Mathis, 620 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 1993). See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying
text.
258. Mathis, 620 So. 2d at 1217.
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list of names of persons having any relevant information, Mathis did not disclose
the name of the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on the deceased.259
Even more damaging, Mathis falsely told the district court, "No autopsy has
been performed.""2 '
Thus, although the court should seek to deter conduct similar to Land's, it was
unfair to suspend Land for a year. Not even one member of the Complaint
Tribunal believed that Land's conduct violated his ethical duty to opposing coun-
sel. In addition, unlike Mathis, Land did not lie to the court nor did he attempt to
conceal key witnesses.
C. Unintentional Disclosure of Private Information
An interesting question that arises from the Land case is whether the plaintiff's
attorney McMahan is also guilty of an ethical violation in examining Attorney
Land's client file.261 Even though the Mississippi Supreme Court has not spoken
to this issue,262 the American Bar Association has addressed the duty a lawyer
owes to opposing counsel not to inspect unauthorized materials.
In 1992, the ABA set out the framework to which an attorney should adhere
after receiving confidential materials clearly not intended for the recipient.263 An
ethical lawyer "(a) should not examine the materials once the inadvertence is dis-
covered, (b) should notify the sending lawyer of their receipt and (c) should abide
by the sending lawyer's instructions as to their disposition." '264 The ABA intend-
ed this three-part test to be used in situations where facsimile transmissions have
been misdialed, where files have been misdelivered, or even where electronic
mail has been sent to the wrong computer. 65 In reaching this conclusion, the
ABA stressed the importance of confidentiality over competing tenets in the
attorney/client relationship. 66 First, the ABA explained, loss of confidentiality is
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Mississippi Bar's Brief at 7. A runner from Land's firm inadvertently delivered Land's file concerning
the Guthrie case to McMahan's office. Id. McMahan proceeded to inspect the contents of the file, where he
discovered the photographs and other information related to the BB gun shooting. Id. McMahan then associat-
ed William L. Denton, who filed an amended complaint adding Land and State Farm as defendants. Id.
262. This issue was probably not addressed in Land because it has no relevance as to whether Land himself
was guilty of violating the ethical rules.
263. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. Model Rule 1.6 codifies the attorney obligation not to reveal confidential information of his client.
Rule 1.6 mandates:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client con-
sents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and
the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon
conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning
the lawyer's representation of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.6 (1983).
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too high a price to pay for punishing the carelessness of the sending lawyer.
267
Second, rules are already in place to encourage attorneys to be careful with con-
fidential materials.21 Punishing the sending attorney by forfeiture of confiden-
tial materials ignores the fact that all humans make mistakes.269 Perhaps most
importantly, the ABA rejected the argument that a lawyer's duty to zealously rep-
resent his client obligated him to use the confidential materials.7
Because the briefs of the parties only present a cursory sketch of the circum-
stances surrounding Attorney McMahan's examination of Jack Land's file, it is
impossible to state whether McMahan actually violated an ethical duty.
However, on the basis of the ABA's three-part test set forth above, McMahan
clearly violated his duty to opposing counsel if the file, on its face, was not
intended for him and he proceeded to review the materials. Moreover, even if it
was not clear at first to McMahan that the file was not intended for him, he had a
duty to notify Jack Land that he had mistakenly received the file once he realized
the information was confidential.
The question of whether Attorney McMahan violated his duty to opposing
counsel, however, cannot be answered solely on the basis of his behavior.
Instead, the conduct of Jack Land in withholding discoverable information must
also be considered.
In 1994, the ABA considered the lawyer's duty to opposing counsel when an
unauthorized sender "intended for the receiving lawyer to receive and make use
of the transmitted materials. '271 In this opinion, the Commitee clarified that it
did not endorse an absolute rule that prohibited a receiving lawyer from examin-
ing or using confidential information in all situations. Specifically, the
Committee stated that a lawyer may be able to use materials that "should have
been, but were not, produced by an adverse party in response to pending discov-
ery requests."
272
It is virtually impossible to evaluate how a court would rule on McMahan's
actions based on the above ABA opinions. It may be that McMahan violated an
ethical duty simply by looking inside Land's file, if the file was clearly not
intended for him. However, the 1994 Ethics Opinion suggests that even if an
attorney looks at confidential material, this conduct may not be unethical if
opposing counsel improperly withheld the information. 3
267. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992).
268. Id. See, e.g., Model Rule 1.6.
269. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992).
270. Id. Canon 7 of the Model Code mandates that "a lawyer should represent a client zealously within the
bounds of the law." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). Although the Model
Rules do not provide an equally strong edict, Rule 1.3 does state that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable dili-
gence and promptness in representing a client." MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.3 (1983).
271. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994).
272. Id. In this example, the Committee felt that a receiving lawyer satisfies his duty to opposing counsel by
(a) refraining from reviewing materials which are probably privileged or confidential, any further
than is necessary to determine how appropriately to proceed, (b) notifying the adverse party or the
party's lawyer that the receiving lawyer possesses such documents, (c) following the instructions of
the adverse party's lawyer; or (d) in the case of a dispute, refraining from using the materials until a
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are, by their very nature, rules of
ambiguity which must be interpreted in light of the facts of each case. The
court's decision in Land has not alleviated any of this uncertainty. A proper read-
ing of Land, however, is that a lawyer should seek to resolve any doubts in
answering pleadings on the side of caution. The court will not condone discov-
ery practices which exclude material based on a narrow reading of discovery
requests.

